BY ABTHUE JENNE8S
UNIVERSITY Or NEBRASKA I N a previous article 2 the writer mentioned a series of experiments carried on at Syracuse University, the purpose of which was to provide data which might aid in answering such questions as the following: Under controlled conditions, what per cent of individuals alter their expressions of opinion during discussion? Is the accuracy of individual judgments or opinions increased by discussion? Is the average opinion of the group more accurate after discussion than before? Is the typicality of the group increased during discussion? Are men more or less likely to change their opinions than are women? If there are changes, are they due to discussion itself or to other factors? Is there a relationship between willingness to alter opinion during discussion or to take the leadership in discussion groups, and standing in ascendance-submission, aggressiveness and mental tests?
It was also suggested that a topic to be discussed under experimental conditions should allow for (1) interest and comprehension on the part of the subjects, (2) diversity of opinion, (3) quantitative standards of measurement, (4) central point from which to measure dispersion, (5) sufficient range for expression of opinion so that no one might hold a more extreme opinion or judgment than is provided for in the scale of measurement. The present article will describe several experiments which were designed to furnish data bearing on the above-mentioned problems.
THE QUESTION EMPLOYED
In view of the practical difficulties involved in the use of attitude scales and topics of general importance, an extremely simple problem was used as the basis of discussion in this series of * Manuscript received October 28, 1932 . 1A more detailed account of the conditions and data of these experiments is to be found in Fart I (pp. 21-82) of "Experimental Studies of Response to Social Stimulation," a Ph.D. dissertation on file at the Syracuse University Library. The writer is indebted to Professor F. H. Allport for suggesting much of the original setting of the experiments and for many helpful criticisms.
2 This JOUENAI, 1932, 27, 29-34. 279 experiments. It concerned the number of beans in a sealed bottle. "WMle such a question may seem to imply oversimplification and artificiality, nevertheless it satisfies the requirements previously mentioned. It allows quantitative statements of opinion and, by comparison with the facts in the case (the actual number of beans), provides measurements of the quality of judgments. The large number of beans in the bottle renders all judgments approximate (and therefore opinionative), due to the impossibility of calculating the exact number. The possible range of judgments is from zero to infinity, neither of which limits is likely to be closely approached. A considerable number of simple statistical techniques is applicable to data such as results from numerical judgments. A further advantage possessed by this question is that it involves little, if any, emotional bias.
SUBJECTS AND GENERAL, PBOCEDTJBE
The subjects who took part in this experiment were college students. They represent a highly selected group, restricted as to age, social status, intelligence and interests. These limitations should be respected in generalizing from the data which are to be presented.
For convenience, the 101 subjects will be described in four groups, as follows:
Group A-Twenty-six students in social psychology, 15 men and 11 women, classified as juniors, seniors and graduate students.
Group B-Twenty-four students in general psychology, 8 men and 16 women, classified as sophomores, juniors and seniors.
Group C-Twenty-three students in general psychology, 5 men and 18 women, classified as sophomores, juniors and seniors.
Group D-Twenty-eight students in general psychology, 23 men and 5 women, classified as sophomores, juniors and seniors, considered as a group for convenience, though they did not meet together. They were included as "controls" for purposes which will be explained later.
A number of sixteen ounce medicine bottles were prepared, each containing 811 small white beans. The bottles were corked and sealed with wax, so that the beans could not be removed. Three methods of presenting the question and controlling the discussion were followed, each of which will be described with the results tabulated separately. A fourth experiment, intended as a "control", in which no discussion took place, will also be described.
In every case the subjects made their first judgments in private in a room adjoining the office of the instructor of a class in which they were registered. They were under the impression that they were undergoing a test of their ability and that it would be desirable to make the best possible showing on the "test". This was done in order to promote interest in the question and to make sure that they took the matter seriously. All of the group meetings were held in university classrooms.
I. DISCUSSION IN SMALL GEOTJPS WITH KNOWN DIVERSITY OF OPINION.
The members of Group A took part in the first experiment. After all of the individual judgments had been made, the experimenter announced that the class would be divided into groups of three, so that each person might have the benefit of discussing the question with other individuals. The names of the persons constituting the various groups were read from a list previously prepared. Before the groups were assigned to the classrooms where the discussion was to take place, instructions were given that each committee was to carry out the following procedure:
(1) elect a chairman, (2) decide on a number to represent the consensus of the committee, (3) return to the regular classroom where each member would write a report of what had taken place and also write his final judgment of the number of beans, regardless of what his committee had agreed upon as the correct number. This represents a weakness in method of experimentation, perhaps, because it called the attention of the subjects to the fact that their behavior was being watched closely. If the subjects had not been cautioned to remember what took place, however, the probability is that their reports would have been quite inaccurate.
As an incentive for a thorough consideration of the question, the instructor announced that the individual whose final judgment most nearly approximated the correct number of beans would be excused from writing up the experiment as a class exercise (which the other subjects were required to do), and in addition would receive a grade of "A" for that assignment. The same offer was made to the chairman of the committee which should report the group estimate most nearly approximating the true number of beans. The purpose of this latter offer was two-fold: (1) to afford an incentive for each subject to assert his ascendance in getting himself elected chairman of his committee, (2) to stimulate the chairman to greater effort in influencing the other mem-bers of the committee toward a group estimate which seemed to him to be the most nearly correct.
The groups were then assigned to separate classrooms, where they were allowed to remain for fifteen minutes before returning to the regular classroom. Each group was provided with one of the 16 ounce medicine bottles containing 811 beans, to serve as a basis for discussion.
In dividing the class into groups, the committees had been "loaded", without the knowledge of the subjects, in two ways. In the first place, as great diversity of opinion as possible (based on the original judgments), was represented in each committee. This was to promote discussion, to make it more difficult to reach a conclusion and to prevent two members of the committee from combining against the third at the beginning. In addition to this, each committee contained one individual whose ascendancesubmission score, as determined by the A-S Reaction Study, 8 was higher than the scores of the other two individuals. The purpose of this latter condition was: (1) to discover whether there was any relationship between the ascendance-submission score and the amount of change of opinion during discussion and (2) to discover whether the more ascendant individuals would be elected chairmen of their committees. The results showed little evidence of such tendencies, though the committee reports indicated a striking tendency for the individual standing highest in ascendance to take the lead in suggesting what the committee procedure should be.
As the A-S Reaction Study has two forms, one for men and one for women, with a scoring system using quite widely different numerical values, it was necessary to divide the group into committees on the basis of sex. The first five committees consisted of men and the other four of women. Committee IX contained only two members, as the number of subjects was not evenly divisible by three.
BESULTS AND COMMENT
The results of this experiment are summed up in Table I . It is to be regretted that the complete data cannot be presented, as in many eases only the whole distribution gives an adequate picture of the results. Many of the writer's generalizations are based on his knowledge of these distributions, rather than on the figures representing central tendencies, which may account in part for a lack of emphasis on probable errors in the discussion of results. While many of the data of Table I explain themselves, several items deserve comment. In the first place, both the mean and the median for the whole group are farther from the true number of beans after discussion than they were before. Taking these facts by themselves, one might hasten to the conclusion that discussion on a matter of fact does not seem to improve the accuracy of judgments. Certainly that is what results when one takes the group viewpoint, but when the statistics on individual members are taken into account it is evident that 20 of the 26 individuals improved their judgment. It will also be noticed that the average error was reduced from 305 to 122, or 60 per cent, following discussion. The figures for the medians, though somewhat smaller numerically, indicate the same tendency. The change was from 200 before to 105 after discussion, a reduction of 48 per cent. Probably just such situations frequently exist in communities where discussion of public questions does not seem to increase the accuracy of the "consensus" or average opinion; actually, however, the individual opinions of the members concerned may have increased considerably in accuracy during or after discussion.
The increase in typicality of opinion is quite marked, no matter what standard of judgment is employed. The range of the whole group went from 1875 before discussion to 474 afterward, a decrease of 75 per cent. The range represented in each committee decreased in every case as a result of discussion. The average decrease of range per committee was 569 and the median of the committee decreases was 600. The quartile deviation or semiinterquartile range was lowered from 225 to 106, a reduction of 53 per cent. The standard deviation also indicated a decrease from 412 to 135, or 67 per cent.
The average number of steps changed is 195, or about 38 per cent of the number of beans in the bottle. This figure may be taken to represent the change of opinion quantitatively.
Calculations intended to bring out sex differences show that the average judgment of the women was 17 per cent higher than that of the men before discussion and considerably less accurate. After discussion, the average judgment of the women was 26 per cent higher than that of the men and considerably more accurate. The average number of steps changed by the women was 49 per cent greater than that of the men.
"INTELLIGENCE" AND CHANGE OF OPINION
A matter of minor interest was the relationship of "intelligence" to error of estimate, both before and after discussion. In Group A, the coefficient of correlation by the rank-difference method between the standings of the individuals in Morgan's Mental Test* and the errors of estimate before discussion was -.05 ±.13, while after discussion the coefficient was -.33 ±.12. Although the coefficients are too low for predictive purposes, the tendency seems to be for the duller individuals to make better judgments after discussion, though their original estimates are approximately as accurate as those of the brighter individuals. Were the second coefficient higher, one might suggest the generalization that the benefit derived from discussion varies inversely with intelligence, the less intelligent persons profiting most and the more intelligent persons profiting least. It is obvious, however, that these figures may describe only a chance occurrence. The number of steps changed seemed also to bear little relation to the factor of intelligence. The coefficient of correlation by the rank-difference method in this case is -.13 ±.13.
II. DISCUSSION IN SMALL GROUPS WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF THE WIDELY DIFFERING OPINIONS OF OTHERS.
Approximately one year after the experiment in which the advanced students took part, a somewhat similar procedure was employed "with a group of beginning students. The same bottles were used, each containing 811 beans and the initial judgments were made in a room adjoining the office of the instructor, as in the previous experiment. At the close of the proceedings, the subjects were asked whether they had ever heard of a similar test. Their unanimous negative reply was taken to indicate that there was no carry-over of information from the previous undertaking.
In the second experiment, the selection of committees and the committee procedure itself differed from the conditions prevailing in the first experiment. In dividing the members of Group B into discussion units, four members constituted a committee, instead of three, as formerly; no attention was paid to the personality traits of the subjects, nor were the women segregated from the men. Another condition peculiar to the experiment with Group B was that each committee, instead of representing fairly wide diversity in original estimate, represented as close agreement on the initial judgment as was possible. Committee I, for example, was composed of the four subjects whose first estimates were the lowest in the class. Committee II contained those whose estimates were next higher and so on, until Committee VI represented the four highest initial judgments. This "loading" was carried out deliberately in an attempt to bring about conditions as nearly as possible the antitheses of conditions in the experiment with Group A. In the latter experiment the mere knowledge that others differed, apart from the discussion itself, might be expected to cause the individual to modify his judgment. It is at least conceivable that the individuals might have changed their estimates fully as much if they had simply read about the estimates made by others, without coming into face to face relationship for discussion at all. In other words, where there is no indication that others differ in opinion, discussion may not necessarily bring out any further knowledge of the question and consequently may not stimulate a change of opinion.
5 This situation is further complicated by the fact that what Professor Allport calls the impression of universality 0 might be expected to occur under the circumstances. For example, four subjects, meeting in a group and finding that they differed only slightly in their estimates, might conceivably come to labor under the delusion that since they represent a fair sample of the class, the probability is that every one in the class, or nearly every one, believes as they •do. If it may be assumed that the other individuals have made about the same estimates, it is only reasonable under the circumstances to assume that the judgments are fairly correct. A weakness in the method of experimentation is that no check was provided to ascertain whether or not this impression of universality really did prevail. From his observation of the committees in action, the experimenter believes the impression of universality was present, but he has no definite proof of its existence.
The adoption of these conditions also served as a check on any generalizations regarding change of opinion as a result of discussion which might be made from an experiment such as the preceding one. This was deemed necessary, because it seemed probable that outside the laboratory the conditions under which discussion takes place may more nearly approximate those which prevailed in Group B, rather than those exercised in the case of •Group A. In numerous instances, at least, when a question is discussed generally throughout a community, it is taken up mainly in small groups of persons whose opinions agree at the start. This fact should be recognized in laying out experimental situations.
RESULTS AND COMMENT
The numerical data from this experiment are included in Table  II .
In one respect, the results shown in Table II antithesize to a certain extent the data of Table I , where neither the average nor the median of the whole group showed improvement, while 77 per cent of the individuals improved the accuracy of their judgments. Table II indicates that for Group B the average after discussion is 39 closer to the correct number of beans than it was before, representing 85 per cent improvement, and the median is 26 closer afterwards, an improvement of 59 per cent. However, only half of the individuals improved their personal judgments, while one-third of them decreased the accuracy of their estimates and one-sixth made no change at all. Both the average and median number of steps changed in this experiment are considerably less than the corresponding figures for Group A, and for those of Group C, which are to be presented in Table III . The average error was also decreased less in the case of Group B than it was in the other groups. It is also evident that the total range of opinion was increased by 75 steps, or 6 per cent. The other measures of dispersion, however, indicate an increase of typicality, the quartile deviation being changed from 216 to 161, a reduction of 25 per cent, and the standard deviation from 313 to 279, slightly less than 11 per cent. While the evidence here is not entirely reliable, it points strongly to the conclusion that the absence of knowledge that other individuals differ, while it does not militate against improvement in accuracy of the consensus as judged by the average or median of a group, nevertheless does tend to decrease individual change of opinion and individual improvement in accuracy and to prevent narrowing the range of opinion during discussion regarding a matter of fact. This conclusion is further enhanced by the indication that the average range of opinion within the committees is not decreased by discussion, as was the case in Groups A and C, but that it is increased. Three of the committees increased their range, two decreased it and one made no change in its range. In the other experiments no committee failed to decrease its range, the average decrease in the other experiments being approximately six times the average increase shown in Group B.
What the effect would be in case of a question of opinion, instead of a matter of fact, might afford considerable speculation. Under such circumstances, the probability is that among members of small groups, absence of the knowledge that others differ might tend to make discussion strengthen the opinions originally held, rather than to change them to any extent.
The data indicating sex differences are remarkably similar to the corresponding figures in the preceding experiment, in spite of the fact that the sexes were not segregated in the case of Group B, while in Group A they were. In the present case, the average estimate of the women was 18 per cent higher than that of the men before discussion, 32 per cent higher after discussion, and considerably more accurate after discussion than that of the men, even though the average of the women was less accurate than that of the men before discussion.
HI. DISCUSSION AMONG CHANCE GROUPS IN A LABGE MEETING
The individuals of Group C took part in the third experiment. Fortunately for the experimenter, a situation arose in the classroom, shortly after the individual judgments had been made, which brought on what seemed to be a spontaneous discussion of the question. On being asked to do so, the experimenter read aloud the names of the subjects and their initial estimates. With this knowledge, the subjects were given opportunity to discuss the question for thirteen minutes (two minutes having been consumed in reading the estimates, etc.). Eight of the bottles were issued to members of the class as they sat in the classroom. Several of the subjects changed seats, so as to gain closer observation of the bottles. In this way were formed "natural" committees, of from two to four members each, probably better suited for purposes of discussion than the "loaded" committees of the previous experiments. While the discussions were carried on aloud, so that the subjects might hear what members of other groups said, most of the discussion took place within the committees, rather than between committees. At the close of the experiment each subject wrote his final secret judgment on a piece of paper which was given to the experimenter.
KESULTS AND COMMENT
In Table III the statistical devices employed in dealing with the results of previous experiments have been applied to the present data, even though the committees were not of uniform size. In general, the data for Group C resemble those for Group A more closely than they do those for Group B. This is probably due to the fact that in Group C, as in the case of Group A, each subject knew that other subjects differed considerably from his own estimate. The average and median estimates of the group show strikingly little change, however. It is here, more nearly even than in the preceding experiments, that the danger of generalizing regarding the improvement in consensus of a group as indicated by the average or the median is plainly to be seen. Although the average judgment is not significantly nearer the correct number of beans, 17 subjects, or 74 per cent of the whole group, improved their judgments, while 5 subjects or 22 per cent decreased in accuracy. Only one subject failed to change his estimate.
The average error was decreased from 465 before discussion to 279 afterward, an increase in accuracy of 40 per cent. The median error also indicates a considerable increase in accuracy, being reduced from 304 to 111, or approximately 63 per cent. The range of the whole group was reduced by only 15 per cent, but the extremely large range represented here is plainly due to an enormously high estimate made by one of the women. Here the true reduction in dispersion is probably better indicated by the change in quartile deviation, which was reduced from 337 to 125, or 63 per cent. The standard deviation was 891 before discussion and 772 afterward, the large figures being due no doubt to the one extreme estimate mentioned above. Every '' committee'' showed a considerable decrease in dispersion, the average decrease being 549 and the median decrease being 580. Here again the medians of the ranges represented in the "committees" before and after discussion, 717 and 50, respectively, are probably better criteria than the means, because of the extreme effect caused by the one high estimate previously mentioned.
The data indicating sex differences are quite similar to those recorded in the previous experiments. The average judgment of the women was 16 per cent higher than that of the men before discussion and 25 per cent higher after discussion, while the average number of steps changed among the women was 104 per cent higher than that of the men. In this experiment, however, the average judgment of the men was more accurate than that of the women after discussion, a condition dissimilar to the one prevailing in the previous experiments.
IV. A CONTROL EXPERIMENT
In presenting the data of these experiments it has been assumed that the changes in estimates made by the subjects were largely due to the type of discussion which resulted in the awareness that others held different opinions. A serious objection to this assumption is the fact that many of the changes may have been due to the opportunity to make a second observation of the bottles of beans, rather than to any influence present under the conditions of discussion. In order to ascertain how much of this change might have been due to second observation, a control experiment was carried out with the members of Group D as subjects. Here the subjects were asked to make two estimates with no opportunity for discussion.
RESULTS AND COMMENT
The data from the control experiment appear in Table IV . As these individuals did not meet in groups, several of the columns which appear in the preceding tables are necessarily absent there. Table IV shows the mean of the second estimates to be slightly farther from the actual number of beans than is the mean of the first estimates, indicating a loss in accuracy of approximately 3 per cent. The median is 1 per cent less accurate. The average error is reduced from 338 to 323 and the median error from 167 to 160, only 4 per cent in both cases. This is considerably less than is to be found in the other tables, with the possible exception of Table II , which indicates a reduction in mean error of 17 per cent and a reduction in median error of 30 per cent. For Groups A and C, respectively, the mean errors were reduced 60 per cent and 40 per cent; the median errors, 48 per cent and 63 per cent. It will also be noticed that in the control group 16 individuals (57 per cent) improved the accuracy of their estimates, while 11 (39 per cent) decreased their accuracy and the judgment of one (4 per cent) remained the same. In Groups A and C, respectively, 77 per cent and 74 per cent of the individuals improved their judgments; in Group A, 23 per cent decreased the accuracy" of their estimates; in Group C, 22 per cent decreased the accuracy of their estimates and 4 per cent made no change. In Group B, where the subjects had opportunity for discussion, but did not know how greatly the others differed, 50 per cent of the individuals improved their judgments, 33 per cent reduced their accuracy and 17 per cent made no change.
This may be taken to indicate that the increase in accuracy of individual judgments shown in the case of Groups A and C is due largely to the fact that the subjects knew how the estimates of others differed from their own. Evidently the opportunity to make a second choice had little to do with the improvement. The effect of discussion in increasing accuracy of individual estimates seems to be negligible, as the results where discussion took place in the absence of knowledge of the differing judgments of others are quite similar to those obtained in the control group.
It must be remembered, moreover, that the number of individuals making no change was greatest in Group B. Were the number of cases involved not so small, the conclusion might be drawn that discussion in the absence of awareness of differing judgments tends to increase the strength of the opinion originally held, rather than to change it. The impression of universality may perhaps have been partially responsible for the latter tendency, but of course this is not definitely known.
The total range was changed from 2925 to 2356 by virtue of the second judgments, a reduction of 18 per cent, which corresponds quite closely to the 15 per cent reduction shown in Group C. It is interesting to note that while the standard deviation was decreased from 588 to 496, or 16 per cent, the quartile deviation was increased from 166 to 197, or 19 per cent. This seeming incongruity is explained by the fact that the estimates of two individuals were extremely large in the first place and that the reductions in the squares of the deviations were sufficiently large to account for the change. The true state of affairs is perhaps better indicated by the increase in the quartile deviation, rather than by the reduction of the standard deviation. In any case, it is safe to propose the generalization that the rather large increases in typicality, as measured by decrease in standard deviation and quartile deviation, to be found in Tables I, II , and III were due to the effect of the awareness of the judgments of others, rather than to the opportunity to make a second estimate.
It will also be noticed that the quartile deviation of the errors is increased from 98 to 128, or 31 per cent. In Group A the quartile deviation of the errors was reduced from 150 to 45, in Group C from 217 to 38; in Group B, where the individuals were not aware of the differing opinions held by others, the quartile deviation of the errors was increased from 97 to 101.
Inspection of both the mean and median number of steps changed in all the tables shows these figures for the control group, 188 and 150, respectively, to be much lower than the corresponding figures for Groups A and C, but almost comparable to the figures for Group B. The table for the latter group shows the mean to be 37, or 20 per cent higher than the mean for the control group, but the medians of 150 and 149 are practically the same.
The data on sex differences are not particularly reliable, as only 5 of the 28 subjects in the control group were women. It will be seen, for example, that the average estimate of the men is considerably higher than that of the women on the first estimate, which is not the case in the previous tables. However, the average of the second estimates of the women is higher than the average for the men, as is the case in all previous tables. The average number of steps changed by the women is 252, which is 44 per cent higher than the average of the men. These figures agree rather closely with the figures for the other groups, with the exception of the fact that in Group C the women changed 104 per cent more than the men. The average for the men in Group C is lower than usual, however, and not very reliable, as there were only 5 men in the group.
OBSERVATIONS FKOM THE COMBINED DATA
If the estimates of the individuals in Groups A, B and C are combined, it is evident that 93 per cent of the judgments were changed after discussion. This is approximately the same as the the result obtained in Group D, where no discussion took place, but 96 per cent of the individuals changed their estimates. If Group B, where the subjects were not aware that others held widely differing opinions, is left out of the calculation, it is seen that 98 per cent of the individuals changed their estimates after discussion.
There is little evidence to show that discussion makes the average or the median of the estimates more accurate, but when the results of Groups A and C are combined, it is seen that 76 per cent of the individual estimates are improved, 23 per cent are decreased in accuracy and 2 per cent remain the same, where the subjects are aware of the differing opinions of others. As compared with the corresponding figures for the control group, 57 per cent, 39 per cent and 4 per cent, respectively, the differ-ence is significant. The latter figures more nearly resemble those of Group B, where the figures are 50 per cent, 33 per cent and 17 per cent, respectively. It seems safe to draw the tentative conclusion that the lack of awareness of the differing opinions of others during discussion tends to decrease improvement of estimate to a degree lower than the usual tendency to change of one's own accord.
When the data of Groups A, B and C are combined, the average estimates of the women are 950 and 733, before and after discussion, respectively. The corresponding figures for the men are 798 before, and 707 after discussion. This may be interpreted as an indication of the influence of social pressure in contributing to understatement, rather than overstatement of opinion, even after the individuals who constituted the social situation are no longer present.
The men of Groups A, B and C showed an average change of 214 steps, while the corresponding figure for the women was 309. In all of the tables this same tendency for the women to make greater changes than those made by the men is evident. There seems to be little evidence that discussion is a factor influencing this relationship, as the women exceed the men in average number of steps changed, whether discussion has taken place or not.
SUMMARY
(The following summary must not be regarded as a list of final conclusions, if for no other reason than that rather large probable errors have been disregarded in treating the data. There is reason to believe, however, that data similar to those presented here will result whenever the same experimental conditions prevail.)
1. "When a considerable number of persons entered into discussion of a question of fact, either in a large group, or in several smaller groups, and learned that other individuals differed materially in their opinions regarding the question, the following results occurred:
(a) The number of individuals who did not alter their opinions was negligible. However, approximately the same number of changes occurred in a control group where the subjects were asked to make two estimates without opportunity for discussion. (b) The accuracy of the average judgment of the individuals was not improved.
